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作者

Xiaoqiang Shen;Liping Wang;Xiangdong Wang;Zhou Zhang;Zhangwei Lu

来源

HABITAT INTERNATIONAL,Vol.89,P.102007

语言

英文

关键字

Plan implementation;Urban expansion;Non-conformance;Decision-making;Stakeholder;China

作者单位

School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, 730000, China;Institute of Local Government Development, Shantou University, Shantou, 515063, China;Law School, Shantou University, Shantou, 515063, China;School of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400045, China;School of Landscape Architecture, Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University, Hangzhou, 311300, China;School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, 730000, China;Institute of Local Government Development, Shantou University, Shantou, 515063, China;Law School, Shantou University, Shantou, 515063, China;School of Construction Management and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing, 400045, China;School of Landscape Architecture, Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University, Hangzhou, 311300, China

摘要

Non-conformances between outcomes and plans are widely considered inevitable. However, interpretation of non-conformances is still deficient. Since non-conforming urban development is a direct result of land-use decision-making, this study seeks to explain non-conforming urban expansion by exploring stakeholders’ decision-making behavior. We develop an interpreting framework that combines state and market forces, and use it to investigate the drivers of non-conforming decisions. The results of a Chinese case study indicate that local governments played multiple roles in non-conforming urban expansion, through which they increased financial revenue, sited large-scale development projects, and provided public goods. Manufacturing investors mainly based location decisions on development conditions and policies, rather than on zoning maps. Their influence on land supply decision-making was positively correlated with their investment scale, whereas commercial and housing developers had more limited influence. Most collective land owners supported land expropriation and some carried out informal development to generate economic returns. We suggest that non-conformances resulted from both government-led and bottom-up urbanization, and that the local government played a key role based on the market mechanism.