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作者

Aika Monden;Katsuyoshi Takashima;Yusuke Zennyo

来源

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.49,Issue2,P.556-573

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

摘要

This article investigates shopping center rent contracts that have a two-part tariff structure: charging a fixed rent plus a percentage of sales. We consider a game-theoretic model, wherein a shopping center developer offers different contracts for two types of retailers: large and small. The retailers face demand uncertainties. We show the developer offers a lower percentage fee for the large retailer. Alternatively, it offers a higher fixed fee for the large retailer, unless the small retailer faces largely uncertain demand. The developer's expected profit increases with the demand uncertainty, which would suggest the developer should assemble nearly homogeneous retailers.