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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.54,Issue2,P.188-215

语言

英文

关键字

Online; auctions; REO; foreclosure; real estate transactions; SPATIAL-AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL; DISTURBANCES; PROPERTY; PRICE; TIME

作者单位

[Chinloy, Peter] Amer Univ, Kogod Sch Business 229, Dept Finance & Real Estate, 4400 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20016 USA. [Hardin, William, III; Wu, Zhonghua] Florida Int Univ, Hollo Sch Real Estate, Coll Business Adm, 1101 Brickell Ave,Suite 1100-S, Miami, FL 33131 USA. Hardin, W (reprint author), Florida Int Univ, Hollo Sch Real Estate, Coll Business Adm, 1101 Brickell Ave,Suite 1100-S, Miami, FL 33131 USA. E-Mail: chinloy@american.edu; hardinw@fiu.edu; wuz@fiu.edu

摘要

Assessment of lender and third-party bidder acquired properties at foreclosure auction is provided. Properties acquired at foreclosure auction by third-party bidders transact at a discount to lender dispositions of real estate owned (REO) properties. The discount reflects a reduction in costs associated with lender owned (REO) dispositions and uncertainty faced by third-party bidders. Moreover, there is a ranking in transaction prices among initial purchases by third-party bidders at foreclosure auction, REO sales, non-distressed property sales and the subsequent sales of third-party bidder acquired properties. Third-party bidder auction prices are below REO sale prices, which are below non-distressed property sale prices, which are below the subsequent sale prices of third-party bidder acquired properties. The price spacing by cohort is logical, intuitive and economically justified in a market with rational participants. Implications are also apparent for the measurement of price changes, net sale proceeds and returns to residential real estate.