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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.54,Issue2,P.139-164

语言

英文

关键字

Principal/Agent conflict; Asymmetric information; Moral hazard; RESIDENTIAL REAL-ESTATE; PROPENSITY SCORE; MARKET; BROKERAGE; PRICE; TIME; PERFORMANCE; INCENTIVES; LIQUIDITY; CAUSAL

作者单位

[Bian, Xun; Waller, Bennie D.] Longwood Univ, Farmville, VA 23909 USA. [Turnbull, Geoffrey K.] Univ Cent Florida, Orlando, FL 32816 USA. Waller, BD (reprint author), Longwood Univ, Farmville, VA 23909 USA. E-Mail: bianx@longwood.edu; Geoffrey.Turnbull@ucf.edu; wallerbd@longwood.edu

摘要

This study is the first to examine the principal-agent issues surrounding how agents' efforts to sell their own properties affect their efforts to sell concurrently listed client properties. The principal-agent model shows that listed agent-owned properties induce agents to worker harder over all, but diminish effort dedicated to marketing concurrently listed client properties, leading to reduced liquidity and/or lower selling prices for those properties. The empirical results show that client properties competing with agent-owned properties remain on the market 30 to 46 % longer and sell for 1.8 % less than properties whose agents have no such conflict of interest.