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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.99,P.15-30

语言

英文

关键字

Education spending; Yardstick competition; Electoral and educational accountability; TERM LIMITS; POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE; LOCAL-GOVERNMENTS; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; TAX MIMICKING; PERFORMANCE; EFFICIENCY; PATTERNS; DEMAND; REFORM

作者单位

[Terra, Rafael] Univ Brasilia, Econ Dept, FACE, Campus Darcy Ribeiro, BR-70910900 Brasilia, DF, Brazil. [Mattos, Enlinson] Getulio Vargas Fdn, Sao Paulo Sch Econ, 474 Itapeva St, BR-01332000 Sao Paulo, Brazil. Mattos, E (reprint author), Getulio Vargas Fdn, Sao Paulo Sch Econ, 474 Itapeva St, BR-01332000 Sao Paulo, Brazil. E-Mail: rterra@unb.br; Enlinson.Mattos@fgv.br

摘要

This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the effect of education accountability on yardstick competition in educational spending among Brazilian municipalities. An exploratory analysis of the data shows a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction in public educational spending after IDEB disclosure compared with the spatial correlation before disclosure of the index. Our main results explore a discontinuity around the cutoff of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment after IDEB disclosure. The estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation and, thus, yardstick competition is reduced by 52%. Falsification and robustness tests were performed and suggest that we can claim causality around small bandwidths of the cutoff. This finding suggests that the public release of information may decrease the importance of neighbors' information on voters' decisions. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.