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作者

Long Wang;Yang Yang

来源

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.49,Issue1,P.7-35

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

Correspondence Yang Yang, CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 12 Chak Cheung Street, Hong Kong SAR, China. Email: zoeyang@cuhk.edu.hk

摘要

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid bySOEs.