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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.101,P.45-56

语言

英文

关键字

Congestion pricing; Capacity choice; Self-financing infrastructure; Market power; Airport congestion; PUBLIC-GOODS; AIRPORT CONGESTION; PRIVATE PROVISION; TAX COMPETITION; CAPACITY; INVESTMENT; CARRIERS; TOLLS

作者单位

[Verhoef, Erik T.] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Spatial Econ, Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands. [Verhoef, Erik T.] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden. [Verhoef, Erik T.] Tinbergen Inst, Gustav Mahlerpl 117, NL-1082 MS Amsterdam, Netherlands. Verhoef, ET (reprint author), Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Spatial Econ, Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands.; Verhoef, ET (reprint author), Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden.; Verhoef, ET (reprint author), Tinbergen Inst, Gustav Mahlerpl 117, NL-1082 MS Amsterdam, Netherlands. E-Mail: e.t.verhoef@vu.nl

摘要

The Mohring-Harwitz (1962) theorem states that the degree of self-financing of congested infrastructure is equal to the elasticity of the capacity cost function in the optimum, so that under neutral scale economies exact self-financing applies. The theorem breaks down when the infrastructure is used by operators with market power, the case in point often being airlines at a congested airport. This paper proposes a regulatory scheme that restores self-financing in such cases; partially so in general, and perfectly so under specific circumstances that include (1) the satisfaction of a particular proportionality condition, and (2) either the isolation of budgets needed for subsidies to counter demand-related mark-ups, or perfectly elastic demands so that such mark-ups are zero. Moreover, exact self-financing applies in this scheme independent of the elasticity of the capacity cost function, and occurs for both parametric and "manipulable" congestion pricing. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.