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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.55,Issue2,P.216-241

语言

英文

关键字

Rating network structure; Credit rating agencies; Ratings shopping; Rating accuracy; CREDIT RATINGS; INCENTIVES; ACCURACY

作者单位

[Zhuo, Xiaoyang; Wang, Yongjin] Nankai Univ, Sch Business, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China. [Xu, Guangli] Nankai Univ, Sch Math Sci, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China. Xu, GL (reprint author), Nankai Univ, Sch Math Sci, Tianjin 300071, Peoples R China. E-Mail: xuguangli@mail.nankai.edu.cn

摘要

This paper develops an equilibrium model involving credit rating agencies (CRAs), issuers, regulators and investors. The model is based on two key features of the rating industry: the "issuer-pays" business model and competitive market structure. By incorporating the ratings shopping by issuers, we investigate the equilibrium decisions of CRAs and the impact of government regulation on the rating market. More importantly, an evolutionary reform plan named the Rating Network Structure, which is an alliance or a network of CRAs' rating approaches, is proposed to improve market efficiency. Simulations demonstrate that this structure plays a significant role in increasing rating accuracy and market profits. Furthermore, this paper reveals the detrimental effect of competition on the credit rating industry.