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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.55,Issue1,P.32-64

语言

英文

关键字

External advisor; Real estate investment trust (REIT); Organizational structure; Loan contract terms; Information opacity; Certification effect; FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION; LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MATURITY STRUCTURE; CREDIT MARKETS; CON

作者单位

[Deng, Yongheng] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Finance, Dept Real Estate, Singapore, Singapore. [Deng, Yongheng] Natl Univ Singapore, Inst Real Estate Studies, Singapore, Singapore. [Hu, Maggie (Rong)] Univ New South Wales, Sch Banking & Finance, UNSW Business Sch, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. [Srinivasan, Anand] Natl Univ Singapore, NUS Business Sch, Dept Finance, Singapore, Singapore. Hu, M (reprint author), Univ New South Wales, Sch Banking & Finance, UNSW Business Sch, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia. E-Mail: ydeng@nus.edu.sg; m.hu@unsw.edu.au; bizas@nus.edu.sg

摘要

We test for the differences in information asymmetry across two organizational forms (external and internal) in the REIT industry. We find significant differences with external REITs being significantly more transparent relative to internal REITs, and these differences are reflected in the loan contract terms and loan syndicate structure of loans made to these two types of REITs. We find that the relatively more transparent externally advised REITs are offered more favourable loan contracts in terms of lower loan rates and lower likelihood of collateral requirement. Further, loans to external REITs have syndicates that are larger in size and the lead lender retains a smaller portion of the loan, reflecting lower information asymmetry.