打印

作者

来源

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.45,Issue3,P.761-784

语言

英文

关键字

HOUSEHOLD MOBILITY; INSURANCE; BORROWERS; CHOICE; INFORMATION; PENALTIES; MARKETS; DESIGN; MODEL

作者单位

[Brueckner, Jan K.] Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, 3151 Social Sci Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697 USA. [Lee, Kangoh] San Diego State Univ, Dept Econ, 5500 Campanile Dr, San Diego, CA 92182 USA. Brueckner, JK (reprint author), Univ Calif Irvine, Dept Econ, 3151 Social Sci Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697 USA. E-Mail: jkbrueck@uci.edu; klee@mail.sdsu.edu

摘要

Much of the literature on the economics of mortgage markets has studied the fixed vs. adjustable-rate mortgage choice made by individual borrowers. However, to decide if the outcome of such a choice is efficient or approximately so, it is necessary to explore the question of optimal risk-sharing in mortgage contracts. But because only a small literature has studied this question, more research is clearly warranted. The present article helps fill this gap by developing a simplified version of Arvan and Brueckner's model, using it to characterize optimal contracts in the absence of mortgage termination, and then exploring how termination via prepayment or default affects optimal risk-sharing. The broad conclusion of the analysis is that potential mortgage termination makes higher risk exposure for borrowers optimal.