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作者

Lu Fang;Henry J. Munneke

来源

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.48,Issue4,P.957-1003

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

Correspondence Lu Fang and Henry J. Munneke. Email: luf47@psu.edu; hmunneke@uga.edu;Correspondence Lu Fang and Henry J. Munneke. Email: luf47@psu.edu; hmunneke@uga.edu

摘要

Using a sample of 30‐year fixed‐rate subprime mortgage loans, this article empirically examines whether gender inequality exists in the mortgage market, specifically whether a borrower's gender affects the loan contract rate charged, beyond the impact of the borrower's probability of default and prepayment. The results, based on a competing‐risks loan hazard model, reveal that borrowers of different genders have different loan termination patterns. After controlling for the probability of a borrower defaulting or prepaying, female borrowers pay higher contract rates in the subprime mortgage market over the study period.