《Under the Lender's Looking Glass》

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作者
来源
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.55,Issue4,P.435-456
语言
英文
关键字
Collateral; REIT; Secured Debt; Lender Monitoring; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; PRIVATE INFORMATION; SECURED DEBT; EQUILIBRIA; MARKETS; DEFAULT; POLICY
作者单位
[Letdin, Mariya] Florida State Univ, Dept Risk Management Insurance Real Estate & Lega, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA. Letdin, M (reprint author), Florida State Univ, Dept Risk Management Insurance Real Estate & Lega, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA. E-Mail: mletdin@fsu.edu
摘要
This paper studies the impact of bank monitoring on the risk of US equity REITs. Using a unique, hand-collected data sample of mortgage balances, I show that bank screening and monitoring of REIT assets via utilizing secured mortgage financing (vs unsecured, public debt) lowers the overall company risk of a REIT. At the asset level, screening results in retail and office assets with higher acquisition values and located in primary markets, i.e., more transparent assets, being pledged as collateral. Further, I find evidence consistent with the role of lender monitoring for secured mortgage loans and show that properties located in closer proximity to a REIT's headquarters are more likely to be pledged as collateral for a mortgage.