打印

作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.57,Issue1SI,P.64-86

语言

英文

关键字

REITs; Growth; Economies of scale; Corporate governance; ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS; LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY; DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS; REAL-ESTATE; SHAREHOLDER WEALTH; STOCK RETURNS; ASSET GROWTH; FIRM VALUE; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; MANAGERIAL DISCR

作者单位

[Xu, Ruoran] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Secur & Futures, Chengdu 611130, Sichuan, Peoples R China. [Ooi, Joseph T. L.] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Real Estate, Singapore 117566, Singapore. Xu, RR (reprint author), Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Secur & Futures, Chengdu 611130, Sichuan, Peoples R China. E-Mail: xuruoran@swufe.edu.cn; rstooitl@nus.edu.sg

摘要

The rapid growth of REITs over the last two decades raises an old debate on the existence of scale economies. Out of the 874 growth incidents recorded by individual REITs between 1992 and 2012, we observe that 44.5% of them are sub-optimal, that is they resulted in the acquiring REITs operating at decreasing returns to scale. Large REITs with more free cash flows have a higher propensity to engage in bad growth activities. We find evidence that institutional investors play an effective role in discouraging managerial opportunism and empire building. Independent directors and external creditors, however, do not appear to be effective in discouraging REIT managers from making bad growth decisions.