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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.57,Issue2,P.246-263

语言

英文

关键字

Commercial Real Estate; Broker; Signaling; Uncertainty; Execution Risk; MARKETING PERIOD RISK; PORTFOLIO CONTEXT; LOSS AVERSION; BROKERAGE; SEARCH; AGENTS; INVESTMENT; LIQUIDITY; TIME; DISTORTIONS

作者单位

[Cypher, Matthew] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC USA. [Price, S. McKay] Lehigh Univ, Perella Dept Finance, Bethlehem, PA 18015 USA. [Robinson, Spenser] Cent Michigan Univ, Mt Pleasant, MI 48859 USA. [Seiler, Michael J.] Raymond A Mason Sch Business, Dept Finance, POB 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA. Seiler, MJ (reprint author), Raymond A Mason Sch Business, Dept Finance, POB 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA. E-Mail: Matthew.Cypher@georgetown.edu; smp210@lehigh.edu; s.robinson@cmich.edu; Michael.Seiler@mason.wm.edu

摘要

Using a sample of CCIM designees and candidates in an experimental setting, this study examines the impact of broker signaling in commercial real estate transactions. It also explores the effect of certainty of closure in commercial real estate transactions. Findings suggest brokers are able to influence transaction pricing. Moreover, detailed analysis reveals that when a signal is above a reference point implied by previous transactions, the strength of the signal matters; privately communicated signals from reliable sources have significantly greater impact than signals which are made widely available. Additionally, we find an approximately 10% premium in transactions with lower certainty of closure than one with high certainty. The latter result varies by transactional participant type; owner/developers require a larger premium than institutional sellers.