《Tackling the uncertainty of spatial regulations in China: An institutional analysis of the "multi-plan combination"》
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- 作者
- 来源
- HABITAT INTERNATIONAL,Vol.78,P.1-12
- 语言
- 英文
- 关键字
- Spatial regulation; Uncertainty; "Interest politics"; "Legal order"; Credibility; Multi-plan combination; China; LOCAL PUBLIC-FINANCE; URBAN-DEVELOPMENT; LAND-DEVELOPMENT; CREDIBILITY; INTENSITY; PROPERTY; CITIES; RIGHTS; REFORM
- 作者单位
- [Wu, Jiayu] Zhejiang Univ, Coll Agr & Biotechnol, Hangzhou 310058, Zhejiang, Peoples R China. [Song, Yan] Univ N Carolina, Dept City & Reg Planning, Chapel Hill, NC 27517 USA. [Lin, Jian] Peking Univ, Coll Urban & Environm Sci, Dept Urban & Reg Planning, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China. [He, Qingsong] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Publ Adm, 1037Luoyu Rd, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China. He, QS (reprint author), Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Publ Adm, 1037Luoyu Rd, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China. E-Mail: wujiayula@gmail.com; ys@email.unc.edu; jlin@urban.pku.edu.cn; baihualin2013@163.com
- 摘要
- To overcome the problems caused by the uncertainty of spatial regulations, a series of reforms have been proposed in China, although they are considered insufficient. In our study, we first analyse the inherent logic behind the spatial regulations in China from the perspective of two models ("interest politics" to "legal order") and the context of the turn between these two models. The endogeneity and credibility thesis is adopted to explain why spatial regulation reforms that attempt to shift spatial regulation from "interest politics" to "legal order" are partial failures. This paper focuses on a case study of a "multi-plan combination" and argues that "multi-plan combinations" are spatial regulation reforms that changed "interest politics" in the current planning system to the "legal order" through uniform spatial regulation rules. The "multi-plan combination" reforms are not successful as the reform of "multi-plan combinations", which are dominated by the Chinese central government and designed exogenously without endogeneity within governments and among the social public. Therefore, the reforms are ultimately empty institutions.