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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.105,P.70-87

语言

英文

关键字

Fiscal oversight; Fiscal rules; Local government debt; SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT; POLICY; RULES; RESTRAINTS; STATES; DEBT; GERMANY; DEFAULT; DEFICIT; COSTS

作者单位

[Christofzik, Desiree I.] German Council Econ Experts, Wiesbaden, Germany. [Kessing, Sebastian G.] Univ Siegen, Dept Econ, Unteres Schloss 3, D-57072 Siegen, Germany. Kessing, SG (reprint author), Univ Siegen, Dept Econ, Unteres Schloss 3, D-57072 Siegen, Germany. E-Mail: desiree.christofzik@svr-wirtschaft.de; kessing@vwl.wiwi.uni-siegen.de

摘要

A gradually introduced reform of local government accounting made it temporarily possible for municipalities in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia to avoid the effective control of their budget by the authorities in charge of overseeing local government budgets and enforcing the existing fiscal rules. Using this withdrawal of effective fiscal oversight, we identify the effects of fiscal restraints and their enforcement on fiscal outcomes. We find that the withdrawal of oversight has a significant and sizable effect on per capita debt of local governments that were previously constrained by fiscal oversight. Fiscal restraints are important, and oversight and enforcement are key requirements for their success.