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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.104,P.104-123

语言

英文

关键字

Customer discrimination; Matching frictions; Neighborhood externalities; Housing market; EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL; MOTOR-VEHICLE SEARCHES; HOUSING-MARKET; RACIAL-DISCRIMINATION; SEGREGATION; PREJUDICE; PRICES; BIAS

作者单位

[Combes, Pierre-Philippe] Univ Lyon, GATE Lyon St Etienne UMR 5824, CNRS, 93 Chemin Mouilles, F-69131 Ecully, France. [Combes, Pierre-Philippe] Sci Po, Dept Econ, 28 Rue St Peres, F-75007 Paris, France. [Decreuse, Bruno; Trannoy, Alain] Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS EHESS Cent Marseille, Aix Marseille Sch Econ, 5-9 Blvd Bourdet,CS 50498, F-13205 Marseille 1, France. [Schmutz, Benoit] Ecole Polytech, Batiment ENSAE, F-91128 Palaiseau, France. [Schmutz, Benoit] CREST, Batiment ENSAE, F-91128 Palaiseau, France. Trannoy, A (reprint author), Aix Marseille Univ, CNRS EHESS Cent Marseille, Aix Marseille Sch Econ, 5-9 Blvd Bourdet,CS 50498, F-13205 Marseille 1, France. E-Mail: decreuse@univ-amu.fr; benoit.schmutz@polytechnique.edu; alain.trannoy@univ-amu.fr

摘要

This paper describes a novel concept of customer discrimination in the housing market, neighbor discrimination. We develop a matching model with ethnic externalities in which landlords differ in the number of apartments they own within the same building. Larger landlords are more likely to discriminate only if some tenants are prejudiced against the minority group. Observing that minority tenants are less likely than majority group tenants to live in a building with a single large landlord is thus evidence of neighbor discrimination. We show empirically that African immigrants in France are significantly less likely to live in a building owned by a single landlord. This increases the probability that African immigrants live in public housing in localities with more single-landlord private apartment blocks.