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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.56,Issue3,P.410-442

语言

英文

关键字

Real estate investment trust; Seasoned equity offerings; Liquidity risk; Real earnings management; SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS; ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION; STOCK RETURNS; ACCOUNTING INFORMATION; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; CROSS-SECTION; PERFORMANCE; DECISIONS; LEVERA

作者单位

[Deng, Xiaoying] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Econ & Adm, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China. [Ong, Seow Eng] Natl Univ Singapore, Dept Real Estate, 4 Architecture Dr, Singapore 117566, Singapore. Deng, XY (reprint author), Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Publ Econ & Adm, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China. E-Mail: deng.xiaoying@mail.shufe.edu.cn; seong@nus.edu.sg

摘要

We analyze how REITs managers use real earnin gs management to address issues of liquidity risk and increased cost of capital they face during seasoned equity offerings. We show that REITs managers engage in real earnings management instead of accrual earnings management to attract more uninformed trading in order to provide the liquidity service at a lower cost during seasoned equity offerings. We find REITs with higher liquidity risk are more likely to manipulate earnings prior to equity offerings and uninformed trading is higher following real earnings management. Firms set the offer price at a smaller discount after engaging in real earnings management and stock returns decline in the long run. The findings are consistent with real option and liquidity risk explanations for equity offerings.