Case-Based Analysis of Drivers and Challenges for Implementing Government-Led Urban Village Redevelopment Projects in China: Evidence from Zhejiang Province

《Case-Based Analysis of Drivers and Challenges for Implementing Government-Led Urban Village Redevelopment Projects in China: Evidence from Zhejiang Province》

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作者: Dinghuan Yuan;Haijun Bao;Yung Yau;Martin Skitmore

来源: JOURNAL OF URBAN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,Vol.146,Issue3

语言: 英文

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作者单位: Lecturer, School of Public Administration and Emergency Management, Research Center of Emergency Management, Jinan Univ., Huangpu Avenue West, Guangzhou 510630, China. Email: [email protected];Professor, School of Public Administration, Zhejiang Univ. of Finance and Economics, 18 Xueyuan St., Xiasha Higher Education Park, 310018 Hangzhou, China. Email: [email protected];Associate Professor, Dept. of Public Policy, City Univ. of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong 999077, China (corresponding author). https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6416-8556. Email: [email protected];Professor, School of Civil Engineering and Built Environment, Queensland Univ. of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia. Email: [email protected]

摘要: This paper analyses urban village redevelopment projects (UVRPs) in contemporary China using a case-based analysis method. Based on the data collected from 394 UVRPs in Zhejiang province, we reveal that the top-down institutional arrangement is the dominant method for redevelopment of urban villages. Wenzhou city is picked as an example to explore the drivers, policies, and barriers for UVRP implementation under the top-down institutional arrangement. According to the secondary data of government policies and documents, striking the balance of social, economic, and ecological benefits to achieve more sustainable and new-type urbanization is found to be the main stimulus. Grounded in the original fieldwork conducted in 26 urban villages in Wenzhou, this study unravels how the policies for UVRPs are formed and implemented. As for the barriers, from the perspective of villagers, social disputes are caused by the unclear definition of legal property rights, the demand for the construction of temporary relocation housing for the elderly, and the high construction costs of relocated high-rise buildings. The government blames the unruly villagers or nail householders for their excessive requests which increase the transaction costs for settling these issues. Besides, poorly designed policies impede policy implementation. In view of the high costs of policy alteration, the lock-in effects or policy continuity preferred by the government echo the institutional equilibrium put forward by North.