《Dividend Manipulation at Unlisted REITs》
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- 作者
- 来源
- REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.46,Issue4,P.887-935
- 语言
- 英文
- 关键字
- SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS; PAYOUT POLICY; PRIVATE FIRMS; AGENCY COSTS; CASH-FLOW; DETERMINANTS; DECISIONS; INFORMATION; PERFORMANCE; CLIENTELES
- 作者单位
- [Wiley, Jonathan A.] Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Dept Real Estate, Room 1408,POB 3989, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. Wiley, JA (reprint author), Georgia State Univ, Robinson Coll Business, Dept Real Estate, Room 1408,POB 3989, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. E-Mail: jwiley@gsu.edu
- 摘要
- Dividend policy at unlisted firms is confounded by the continuous equity offering-as exists for unlisted REITs. Unlisted firms lack visible share prices, which heightens the sensitivity of investors to dividends paid during the offering. By paying high dividends early, managers of unlisted REITs positively influence the flow of new equity. Dividend manipulation occurs when discretionary yields are exceptionally high and predominantly favorable dividend changes occur during the equity offering, followed by a surge in unfavorable changes after the offering. Evidence of dividend manipulation at unlisted REITs is provided where even discretionary yields are significantly reduced once the offering expires.