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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.57,Issue4,P.535-565

语言

英文

关键字

Land Sale Auctions; Strategic Sequential Bidding; Land Price; Housing Price; Product Differentiation; PRICE ANOMALIES; MARKET; WINNERS; ART

作者单位

[Agarwal, Sumit] Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, 3700 O St NW, Washington, DC 20057 USA. [Li, Jing] Singapore Management Univ, Sch Econ, Singapore 178903, Singapore. [Teo, Ernie] IBM Res, 10 Marina Bay Blvd,41-01, Singapore 4101, Singapore. [Cheong, Alan] Savills Valuat & Profess Serv S Pte Ltd, 30 Cecil St 20-03,Prudential Tower, Singapore 049712, Singapore. Li, J (reprint author), Singapore Management Univ, Sch Econ, Singapore 178903, Singapore. E-Mail: ushakri@yahoo.com; lijing@smu.edu.sg; ernieteo@smu.edu.sg

摘要

This paper studies the extent to which equilibrium land auction prices are pushed up sequentially due to strategic bidding behaviors in government land auction sales. Using a unique dataset that covers the universe of tendering prices submitted by all developers for all residential land auction sales in Singapore, we find that a tenderer's bids are significantly higher where there was a previous land parcel sold within two years and located within four kilometers. The identified price margin decreases with time and geographic distance. Tracking sequential bids submitted by the same developer over time, we find that the incumbent winner of a previous auction is more likely to participate in subsequent nearby land sales as compared to the second-highest bidder of the same auction. However, it does not necessarily win the subsequent sites. We argue that the incumbent deliberately bids up the subsequent land prices to gain pricing advantages to their own parcels.