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作者

来源

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS,Vol.47,Issue1SI,P.66-103

语言

英文

关键字

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; HEDGE FUNDS; PERFORMANCE; INVESTMENT; COSTS

作者单位

[Downs, David H.] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Kornblau Inst, Richmond, VA 23284 USA. [Downs, David H.; Straska, Miroslava; Waller, H. Gregory] Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23284 USA. Downs, DH (reprint author), Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Kornblau Inst, Richmond, VA 23284 USA.; Downs, DH (reprint author), Virginia Commonwealth Univ, Dept Finance Insurance & Real Estate, Sch Business, Richmond, VA 23284 USA. E-Mail: dhdowns@vcu.edu; mstraska@vcu.edu; hgwaller@vcu.edu

摘要

Conventional wisdom suggests that shareholder activism in REITs is less prevalent than in other (non-REIT) public firms because of stronger barriers to hostile takeovers and potentially less undervaluation. Our results, however, suggest that the conventional wisdom does not hold. Specifically, we find that in 2006-2015, Equity REITs (EREITs) are as likely to be targeted by shareholder activists as non-EREITs. We also find that shareholder campaign characteristics and determinants, as well as their value consequences, appear similar for EREITs and non-EREITs. Given that this is the first study to examine shareholder activism in REITs, we raise several questions for future research.