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作者

Luis A. Lopez  ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-8076-59241

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.volumes-and-issues,Issue69-1,P.

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

摘要

This paper examines the principle-agency problem between landlords and real estate agents using novel data on rental contracts. Real estate agents are found to obtain higher contract rents by approximately 1% more for themselves (and family members) than for other landlords, which is economically small. The results suggest that the principle-agency program with real estate agents is less of a concern in the rental market than the ownership market. The reason potentially relates to the commission structure, the relatively low effort associated with finding a tenant, the landlord’s ability to evaluate an agent’s performance, and reputation concerns from repeated interactions.