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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,Vol.59,Issue1,P.56-89

语言

英文

关键字

Information asymmetry; Mortgage default; Debt renegotiation; Servicing; Securitization; Mortgage redefault; Non-agency MBS; MORTGAGE MODIFICATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; SECURITIZATION; FORECLOSURE; BUSINESS

作者单位

[Conklin, James N.] Univ Georgia, Terry Sch Business, Athens, GA 30602 USA. [Diop, Moussa] Univ Wisconsin, Wisconsin Sch Business, Madison, WI USA. [Thao Le] Georgia State Univ, J Mack Robinson Coll Business, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. [D'Lima, Walter] Old Dominion Univ, Norfolk, VA USA. Conklin, JN (reprint author), Univ Georgia, Terry Sch Business, Athens, GA 30602 USA. E-Mail: jnc152@uga.edu; moussa.diop@wisc.edu; tle116@gsu.edu; wdlima@nd.edu

摘要

This paper presents evidence that affiliation between the mortgage servicer and the originator provides a mechanism to reduce information frictions inherent in debt renegotiation. We find that originator-servicer affiliation increases the likelihood of modification by 10-23% using a large sample of delinquent securitized non-agency mortgages. Post-modification, affiliated loans are also 7.3% more likely to not return to severe delinquency within 12 months. Further examination reveals that affiliation affords servicers lower-cost access to borrower and loan information, thus improving their ability to implement effective debt restructuring strategies. In the absence of standardized information transmission between originators and servicers, information critical for debt renegotiation will be lost as banks disintegrate origination and servicing.