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作者

Lewis Lehe;Ayush Pandey

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.131,P.

语言

英文

关键字

Taxis;Transportation;Medallions;Regulation

作者单位

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States;Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States

摘要

This paper incorporates two novelties into steady-state, macroscopic models of street-hail taxi service: (i) heterogeneous drivers; (ii) explicit treatment of a competitive rental market for medallions (the rights to cruise for passengers). When drivers vary only by reservation wage, issuing medallions raises every driver’s take-home pay, and the social optimum requires subsidy. When drivers vary only by marginal cost, issuing medallions may hurt drivers with low-enough marginal costs. Also, when quality declines with marginal cost, the social optimum may require a binding medallion quota or tax.