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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.87,P.114-125

语言

英文

关键字

D78;H21;H23;H71;H72;H77;Economic growth;Federalism;Taxation;Productive public goods

作者单位

McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, United States;McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, United States

摘要

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.