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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.81,P.166-177

语言

英文

关键字

R23;R38;H73;Exclusionary policies;Sorting;Decentralization

作者单位

Department of Economics, Faculty of LAPS, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada;Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA;Department of Economics, Faculty of LAPS, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada;Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA

摘要

Using a simple adverse selection model, we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor. If communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs, the equilibrium exists, is unique, and is efficient. It involves either complete separation, or complete pooling. Different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently. We show how restrictions imposed by a central government may alter the nature of equilibrium: such restrictions may be explained as the choice of a low-income majority altering the equilibrium to the pooling outcome which they prefer.