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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.75,P.29-43

语言

英文

关键字

H7;Q15;R52;Land use regulations;Zoning;Land ownership;Housing supply

作者单位

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of Geography and Environment, United Kingdom"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff2;Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff3;University of Geneva, Economics Department, Switzerland"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff4;Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, United Kingdom"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1;London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Department of Geography and Environment, United Kingdom"}]},"aff2":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff2;Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), United Kingdom"}]},"aff3":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff3;University of Geneva, Economics Department, Switzerland"}]},"aff4":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff4;Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, United Kingdom"}]}},"correspondences":{"cor1":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1

摘要

We model residential land use constraints as the outcome of a political economy game between owners of developed and owners of undeveloped land. Land use constraints benefit the former group via increasing property prices but hurt the latter via increasing development costs. In this setting, more desirable locations are more developed and, as a consequence of political economy forces, more regulated. These predictions are consistent with the patterns we uncover at the US metropolitan area level.