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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.73,P.191-195

语言

英文

关键字

H25;F23;Tax competition;Public goods provision;Trade

作者单位

Institute of Public Economics I, University of Muenster, Wilmergasse 6-8, 48143 Muenster, Germany"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff2;School of Economics and Management, University of Technology Berlin, Strasse des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1;Institute of Public Economics I, University of Muenster, Wilmergasse 6-8, 48143 Muenster, Germany"}]},"aff2":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff2;School of Economics and Management, University of Technology Berlin, Strasse des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany"}]}},"correspondences":{"cor1":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor1

摘要

We introduce transport cost of trade in products into the classical Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model of capital tax competition. It turns out that even small levels of transport cost lead to a complete breakdown of the seminal result, the underprovision of public goods. Instead, there is a symmetric equilibrium with efficient public goods provision in all jurisdictions.