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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.64,P.841-848

语言

英文

关键字

R14;R48;Commuting subsidies;Votingmonocentric city

作者单位

University of Munich, Department of Economics, Ludwigstr., 28, Munich, Germany"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff002;DIW Berlin, Germany"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff003;RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff004;CESifo, Munich, Germany"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor001;University of Munich, Department of Economics, Ludwigstr., 28, Munich, Germany"}]},"aff002":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff002;DIW Berlin, Germany"}]},"aff003":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff003;RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany"}]},"aff004":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff004;CESifo, Munich, Germany"}]}},"correspondences":{"cor001":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor001

摘要

We study a simple model of commuting subsidies with two transport modes. City residents choose where to live and which mode to use. When all land is owned by city residents, one group gains from subsidies what the other loses. With absentee landownership, city residents as a group gain at the expense of landowners. Subsidies toward different modes have different effects, however. For instance, in one case, rich automobile drivers suffer from transit subsidies, while poor transit users may benefit from subsidies to automobiles.