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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.60,P.352-369

语言

英文

关键字

D78;H77;Strategic interaction;School districts;School choice;Spatial probit

作者单位

Centre for European Economic Research and Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, PO Box 103443, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany"}]}]}],"floats":[],"footnotes":[],"affiliations":{"aep-affiliation-id2":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aep-affiliation-id2;Centre for European Economic Research and Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, PO Box 103443, D-68034 Mannheim, Germany"}]}},"attachments":[],"correspondences":{},"scopusAuthorIds":{},"articles":{}},"authorMetadata":[],"banner":{"expanded":false},"biographies":{},"body":{},"browser":{"name":"IE","engine":"Trident

摘要

This paper provides evidence on strategic interaction among local school districts. The analysis makes use of a significant change in the institutional environment for school districts in Michigan in 1996, when the state established a voluntary inter-district choice program. The school districts' participation decisions are modelled as discrete choice decisions using a spatial latent variable model. Strong effects are found saying that lagged adoptions of neighbors positively affect the current probability of participation. A simple test exploiting limitations of student mobility in inter-district transfers suggests that the driving force for interdependencies among adoption decisions was competition for students.