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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.58,P.478-499

语言

英文

关键字

R14;R48;Commuting subsidies;Voting;Monocentric city

作者单位

DIW Berlin, 14191 Berlin, Germany"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff002;Department of Economics and Business Administration, RWTH Aachen University, 52056 Aachen, Germany"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor001;DIW Berlin, 14191 Berlin, Germany"}]},"aff002":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aff002;Department of Economics and Business Administration, RWTH Aachen University, 52056 Aachen, Germany"}]}},"correspondences":{"cor001":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"cor001

摘要

We study the political economy of commuting subsidies in a model of a monocentric city with two income classes. Depending on housing demand and transport costs, either the rich or the poor live in the central city and the other group in the suburbs. Commuting subsidies increase the net income of those with long commutes or high transport costs. They also affect land rents and therefore the income of landowners. The paper studies how the locational pattern of the two income classes and the incidence of landownership affects the support for commuting subsidies.