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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.56,P.498-513

语言

英文

关键字

H7;H3;H1;Federalism;Capital tax competition;Commitment;State leadership

作者单位

CES, University of Munich, and CESifo, Schackstr. 4, 80539 Munich, Germany"}]}]}],"floats":[],"footnotes":[],"affiliations":{"aep-affiliation-id2":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"aep-affiliation-id2;CES, University of Munich, and CESifo, Schackstr. 4, 80539 Munich, Germany"}]}},"attachments":[],"correspondences":{},"scopusAuthorIds":{},"articles":{}},"authorMetadata":[],"banner":{"expanded":false},"biographies":{},"body":{},"browser":{"name":"IE","engine":"Trident

摘要

This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper's main result is that ex-post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.