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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.55,P.639-647

语言

英文

关键字

H2;H4;H7;R;Tax-competition;Market-power

作者单位

Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA"}]},{"#name":"footnote","$":{"id":"FN001;Department of Economics and Finance, Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, GA 30144, USA"}]}},"attachments":[],"correspondences":{},"scopusAuthorIds":{},"articles":{}},"authorMetadata":[],"banner":{"expanded":false},"biographies":{},"body":{},"browser":{"name":"IE","engine":"Trident

摘要

This paper extends the basic tax-competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders. If firms within the jurisdiction are competitive, the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly-rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output. It is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework. In this framework, the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well-known effects identified by the tax competition model.