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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.55,P.499-510

语言

英文

关键字

C71;C72;D43;L13;L41;R10;R30;Collusion;Hotelling;Mergers;Spatial competition

作者单位

Department of Economics and ELSE, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF002;Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Road, U-1063, Storrs, CT 06269-1063, USA"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF003;Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"COR001;Department of Economics and ELSE, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK"}]},"AFF002":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF002;Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 341 Mansfield Road, U-1063, Storrs, CT 06269-1063, USA"}]},"AFF003":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF003;Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Postbus 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands"}]}},"correspondences":{"COR001":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"COR001

摘要

In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. The results have immediate implications for mergers in spatial markets.