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作者

来源

来源 JOURNAL OF URBAN ECONOMICS,Vol.54,P.436-457

语言

英文

关键字

H7;H4

作者单位

Department of Economics and Martin School of Public Policy, Gatton College of Business and Economics, Lexington, KY 40506, USA"}]},{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF002;Department of Economics, Towson University, Towson, MD 21252, USA"}]},{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"COR001;Department of Economics and Martin School of Public Policy, Gatton College of Business and Economics, Lexington, KY 40506, USA"}]},"AFF002":{"#name":"affiliation","$":{"id":"AFF002;Department of Economics, Towson University, Towson, MD 21252, USA"}]}},"correspondences":{"COR001":{"#name":"correspondence","$":{"id":"COR001

摘要

The divergence between tax payments and the cost of providing public services that arise from financing local public services provides an incentive for higher-income communities to deter the entry of lower-income households into their community. Here we demonstrate that higher-income households, to insure that low-income households do not enter their community or reduce the number that do enter, subsidize goods consumed by higher-income households more than by lower-income households. This strategy will make the rich community less attractive to the poor, deterring their entry to the community.