Developer obligations and negotiation-based benefit distribution in urban redevelopment: Evidence from Shenzhen, China

《Developer obligations and negotiation-based benefit distribution in urban redevelopment: Evidence from Shenzhen, China》

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作者: Yishiqin Li;Weifeng Li;Xin Li;Chris Webster

来源: CITIES,Vol.135,Issue1,Article 104166

语言: 英文

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作者单位: Department of Urban Planning and Design, Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, China;Guangdong–Hong Kong-Macau Joint Laboratory for Smart Cities, China;Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, China;Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, China;Department of Urban Planning and Design, Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, China;Guangdong–Hong Kong-Macau Joint Laboratory for Smart Cities, China;Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, China;Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, China;School of Architecture, Harbin Institute of Technology (Shenzhen), Shen Zhen, China;Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Department of Social Work and Social Administration, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Division of Landscape Architecture, Department of Architecture, Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Department of Architecture and Civil Engineering, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;HKJC Centre for Suicide Research and Prevention, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;The Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, Central House, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0NN, UK;School of Urban Design, Wuhan University, No. 299 Bayi Road, Wuchang District, Wuhan 430072, China;Hubei Habitat Environment Research Centre of Engineering and Technology, Wuhan, China;State Key laboratory of urban and regional Ecology, Research Center for Eco-environmental Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100085, China;University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China;Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Urban Megaregion National Observation and Research Station for Eco-Environmental Change, Research Center for Eco-Environmental Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100085, China;Xiongan Institute of Innovation, Xiongan New Area, 071000, China;Department of Urban Planning and Design, And Social Infrastructure for Equity and Wellbeing (SIEW) Lab, Faculty of Architecture, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China;Urban Geographies/Centre for Urban Studies, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 1018 WV, Netherlands;Department of Sociology, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou, 350116, China;School of Economics, Peking University, 5 Summer Palace Road Street, Beijing 100871, China;Institute of Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems, School of Earth and Space Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China;State Key Laboratory of Media Convergence Production Technology and Systems, Beijing, China

摘要: The distribution of potential benefits between local governments and developers in urban redevelopment shows a global popularity of negotiating developer obligations for more value capture in exchange for the adjustments to land-use regulations. Existing literature has focused on the institutional factors at national or city level that determine the effectiveness of developer obligations for public value capturing, neglecting the potential gains obtained by developers and overlooking the influencing factors at project level. This study examines the impact of project-based factors on distributional outcomes by applying a quantitative analysis of citywide urban renewal projects in Shenzhen, China. In the Chinese context, benefit distribution is affected by the involvement of state-owned enterprise (SOE) developers, which have established special relationships with local governments and such relationships vary between local and central SOEs. The results indicate that compared with non-SOEs, local SOEs contribute more negotiable developer obligations, while central SOEs are more likely to receive administrative support for project promotion. Though, neither of them is granted extra development density compared with non-SOEs. This study sheds light on the strategies adopted by Chinese local governments to achieve comprehensive objectives via differentiated treatment to SOEs and non-SOEs in the negotiation-based benefit distribution of marketized urban redevelopment.