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作者

Bridget Fisher;Flávia Leite

来源

CITIES,Vol.125,Issue1,Article 103661

语言

英文

关键字

TIF;Hudson Yards;Development risk;Self-financing;Economic development

作者单位

The New School's Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, 79 Fifth Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003, United States of America;Urban Planning, University of California, Berkeley, Wurster Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, Berkeley, United States of America;The New School's Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, 79 Fifth Avenue, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10003, United States of America;Urban Planning, University of California, Berkeley, Wurster Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720, Berkeley, United States of America

摘要

This research examines how tax increment financing (TIF)’s theoretical ability to pay for itself can be used to camouflage development risks and facilitate project approval, even in a municipality with effective and accountable land use and taxing authorities. The analysis uses a case study of the United States' largest TIF-type project, New York City's Hudson Yards redevelopment project. When proposed, the $3.5 billion public investment in Hudson Yards was sold as self-financing by supporters and elected officials and passed the City Council in 2005 with widespread support. Yet, by documenting the projected and actual costs of implementation over Hudson Yards' first 14 years, the project's first phase cost the city an additional $2.2 billion due to the city's decisions to shift risk from developers onto taxpayers. In light of policy mobility studies' documentation of TIF's global expansion and the use of Hudson Yards as a global model for urban development projects, this viewpoint illustrates the need for transparent risk assignation before project implementation, especially in cities with less robust economies or less formal institutions.