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作者

来源

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS,Vol.41,Issue7,P.999-1016

语言

英文

关键字

作者单位

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign

摘要

Place-bound anchor institutions provide unique resources and institutional capacity to community and economic development. As such, these “eds and meds” play an increasingly important role in community economic development research and practice. Positive assessments of anchors’ contributions, however, remain limited to single-site case studies of specialty hospitals and universities with extensive resources. To deepen inquiry into anchors, we use new data, available due to recent U.S. health care policy changes, to test the impact of hospitals’ service missions and revenue sources on community economic development spending. We identify 4 basic types of hospitals: large comprehensive, specialty, neighborhood continuum of care, and regional continuum of care. Our statistical tests suggest that anchor institution activity—operationalized as community economic development spending—arises predominantly from larger, teaching-intensive hospitals. Hospital characteristics, rather than urban socioeconomic context, provide the strongest predictors of community economic development spending. These results suggest that a narrower range of urban hospitals performs community economic development. However, we discover a significant amount of hospitals in one city (Baltimore, Maryland) invested heavily in community economic development. We conclude by investigating that city’s “anchor plan” policy, which appears to have successfully channeled investment from its anchoring hospitals.AcknowledgmentsWe owe a debt of gratitude to Andrew McMillan, Laura Searfoss, the five anonymous reviewers, and those scholars who responded to an earlier draft of this article that S. A. Sherman presented at the 2018 Urban Affairs Association conference. The usual disclaimers apply.Disclosure statementThe authors declare that they have no relevant material or financial interests that relate to research described in this article.SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAlSupplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher’s website.Additional informationFundingNo external funders contributed to this research.Notes on contributorsStephen Averill ShermanStephen Averill Sherman is a PhD candidate in regional planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. He investigates police, planning regulations, and the political economy of not-for-profits.Marc DoussardMarc Doussard is an Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. His research covers community, urban, and regional development.